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Tax, Trade, and Harmful 
Tax Competition: 
Reflections on the FSC 
Controversy 
by Reuven S. Avi-Yonah 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah is a professor of law at the 
Michigan Law School. 
The current controversy over foreign sales corporations 
(FSCs) provides a good opportu-
nity to address the broader ques-
tion of the proper relationship 
between the international income 
tax regime and the WTO. In par-
ticular, can one identifY aspects of 
international taxation that are 
subject to the jurisdiction of the 
WTO, as reflected in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)? This article will argue 
that there are certain aspects of 
current international income tax 
practice that are subject to the 
jurisdiction of the WTO. In partic-
ular, many of the regimes identi-
fied by the OECD as constituting 
harmful tax competition should 
also be considered export subsidies 
under article XVI of the GATT, 
and, therefore, as being subject to 
challenge under WTO procedures, 
just as the FSCs were challenged 
bytheEU. 
The article is divided into three 
parts. Part I is a general descrip-
tion of those parts of the GATT 
that relate to taxation. Part II 
addresses the application of GATT 
rules to three types of tax havens, 
which I have elsewhere named 
"traditional tax havens," "produc-
tion tax havens," and ''headquar-
ters tax havens."1 The first type 
are the offshore tax havens, while 
the other two are what the OECD 
calls "preferential tax regimes" in 
otherwise high-tax countries. Part 
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II concludes that most production 
tax havens, and some traditional 
and headquarters tax havens, 
constitute export subsidies under 
the GATT. Finally,· Part III asks 
whether harmful tax competition 
is better addressed by the WTO or 
by organizations with less binding 
adjudicatory power, such as the 
OECD. It concludes that, while in 
the short term the OECD has the 
advantage, the WTO may provide 
a better forum in the longer term. 
I. The GATT and Taxes 
There are two articles of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade that bear directly on 
taxation.2 Article III of the GATT 
provides that "internal taxes ... 
should not be applied to imported 
or domestic products so as to afford 
protection to domestic production."3 
Because of the reference to 
products, this provision has 
generally been understood as 
referring only to indirect taxes (i.e., 
excise taxes or consumption taxes 
such as the VAT). However, even if 
the article is interpreted as 
referring to direct taxes as well, it 
seems unlikely that the income 
tax, in particular, can be used as 
an instrument for protecting 
domestic production because of the 
difficulty of designing income tax 
provisions that will apply only to 
foreign production. 4 
Article XVI of the GATT 
provides, in general, for notifica-
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tion procedures in the case of any 
"subsidy ... which operates 
directly or indirectly to increase 
exports of any product from, or to 
reduce imports of any product into, 
[a contracting party's] territory."5 
In addition, the article expressly 
prohibits the use of any subsidy 
"on the export of any product ... 
which subsidy results in the sale of 
such product for export at a price 
lower than the comparable price 
charged for the like product to 
buyers in the domestic market."6 A 
note clarifies that the exemption of 
an exported product from taxes 
borne by the like product when 
destined for domestic consumption 
(such as zero rating exports for 
VAT) "shall not be deemed to be a 
subsidy."7 
Article XVI was significantly 
expanded by the Subsidies Code 
included in the 1994 version of the 
GATT.8 The Subsidies Code defines 
"subsidy'' as including cases where 
"government revenue that is 
otherwise due is foregone or not 
collected."9 To be actionable under 
the GATT, a subsidy must be 
"specific to an enterprise or 
1See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
"Globalization, Tax Competition, and the 
Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State," 113 
Harv. L. Rev. 1573 (2000). 
2The 1994 version of the GATT is part 
of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, reached at 
the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of 
trade negotiations (April1994). GATT 
Secretariat, The Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
- The Legal Texts (Geneva, 1994) (hence-
forward GATT), i. 
3GATT, 490. 
4See Joel Slemrod, Free Trade and 
Protectionist Taxation, NBER Research 
Working Paper 4902 (1994) (while theoret-
ically it is possible to design tax rules that 
have the same effect as tariffs, in practice 
this is difficult to achieve). 
5GATT, 508. 
6GATT, 509. The FSC regime was 
struck down under this provision. 
7GATT, 549. 
8 Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures, GATT 264. 
9GATT, 264. 
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industry or group of enterprises or 
industries."10 In addition, a specific 
subsidy is prohibited only if it is 
"contingent, in law or in fact ... 
upon export performance" or ''upon 
the use of domestic over imported 
goods."11 Annex I to the Subsidies 
Code includes an "illustrative list 
of export subsidies" which includes 
"[t]he full or partial exemption 
remission, or deferral specifically 
related to exports of direct 
taxes ... paid or payable by indus-
trial or commercial enterprises."12 
However, a footnote clarifies that 
this language "is not intended to 
limit a Member from taking 
measures to avoid the double 
taxation of foreign source income 
earned by its enterprises."13 
The other agreement included 
in the 1994 version of the GATT 
that bears on taxation is the 
General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS). Because services 
frequently involve FDI, in this case 
the line between trade and invest-
ment is particularly blurred. 
Therefore, the United States 
inserted provisions in the GATS 
that prevent it from overriding 
domestic tax legislation and 
income tax treaties applicable to 
FDI. In particular, the provision of 
national treatment for service 
providers can be avoided if "the 
difference in treatment is aimed at 
ensuring the equitable and 
effective imposition or collection of 
direct taxes."14 In addition, most 
favored nation (MFN) treatment 
can be avoided if the difference in 
treatment follows from a tax 
treaty.15 
II. Application of GATT 
Rules to Tax Havens 
In previous work, I have identi-
fied three types of tax havens: (a) 
"production tax havens," in which 
there is a specific tax holiday or 
other type of tax benefit designed 
to attract foreign investors to set 
up production facilities in a host 
country; (b) "traditional tax 
havens," i.e., jurisdictions with 
little or no income tax that seek to 
attract foreign investors and 
financial service providers through 
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the promise of no taxation and 
bank secrecy; and (c) "headquar-
ters tax havens," i.e., regimes 
designed to attract multinational 
enterprises to locate their head-
quarters in a jurisdiction by 
promising no taxation (or no 
current taxation) of income derived 
from foreign subsidiaries.16 
How do the GATT rules previ-
ously described apply to these 
three types of tax haven? The 
clearest application is in the case 
of production tax havens. These 
regimes are generally "ring 
fenced," i.e., they are designed to 
foster exports and, therefore, are 
separated from the domestic 
economy (and sometimes also not 
available to domestic investors). 
The regimes are ring fenced 
precisely because they are set up 
by countries with a real domestic 
tax base that do not wish to see 
that base eroded by the tax conces-
sions granted within the preferen-
tial regimes. The EU and OECD 
reports on harmful tax competition 
cite dozens of such regimes, even 
though they limit themselves only 
to regimes of member countries 
and (in the case of the OECD) 
exclude "real" investments (i.e., 
manufacturing) .17 
It would seem that such pro-
duction tax havens constitute 
prohibited export subsidies under 
the GATT. They generally involve 
foregone revenue (i.e., are tax 
expenditures), are specific to 
certain taxpayers (in fact they are 
frequently negotiated deals), and 
are "in fact" contingent on export 
performance, because the products 
or services they involve cannot be 
targeted at the domestic market. 
The case of traditional tax 
havens is harder. Since there is no 
income tax, they do not involve 
"foregone revenue" or a tax expen-
diture in the traditional sense. 
However, traditional tax havens 
frequently grant exemptions to the 
offshore sector from those taxes 
that they do collect (e.g., VAT). 
Moreover, they frequently involve 
not just pure investments (which 
are presumably not covered by the 
current GATT) but, in particular, 
the provision of financial services, 
such as brokerage or insurance, 
targeted entirely at foreigners (and 
frequently ring fenced as well). 
Thus, arguably, traditional tax 
havens, or at least that part of 
their activities that is more than 
10GATT, 265. 
11GATT, 266. 
12GATT, 305. The list also includes a 
provision for exemption or remission of 
indirect taxes in excess of those levied on 
products for domestic consumption, and 
defines direct and indirect taxes to include 
income tax and VAT, respectively. GATT, 
305 n. 58. Deferral is allowed if accompa-
nied by an interest charge. Ibid. 
13GATT, 305 n. 59. 
14GATT, 339-340. 
15GATT, 340; see also GATT, 346 (no 
arbitration in the case of existing tax trea-
ties). 
16For further elaboration, see Avi-
y onah, Globalization, supra. 
17See "OECD Releases Tax Haven 
Blacklist," Tax Notes Int'l, July 3, 2000, p. 
7, or 2000 WTD 124-10, or Doc 2000-17611 
(3 original pages); "Primarolo Group's 
Report Identifies 66 Harmful Tax 
Regimes," Tax Notes Int'l, Mar. 20, 2000, 
p. 1283, or 2000 WTD 50-1, or Doc 
2000-7548 (8 original pages). 
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pure passive investment, fall 
within the prohibition on export 
subsidies as well. Moreover, since 
they are generally not party to tax 
treaties, the exclusion of treaty 
matters from GATS does not cover 
them. 
The toughest cases are head-
quarters tax havens. This covers 
specific regimes designed to attract 
foreign multinational enterprises 
(MNEs), which are akin to produc-
tion tax havens. Those are presum-
ably export subsidies for the 
reasons stated above. However, 
they also cover things like the U.S. 
deferral regime and the European 
exemption for foreign source 
income of domestic MNEs. Are 
these export subsidies under the 
GATT? If the only activity involved 
is pure investment (e.g., the acqui-
sition of a foreign target), then the 
regime is not covered. But usually 
there is also the provision of 
services and/or transfer of intangi-
bles, and frequently also the sale of 
goods to the foreign subsidiaries. 
In these cases there is trade, and 
the provision could be an export 
subsidy. 
The ultimate question in this 
regard is whether deferral or 
exemption is a tax expenditure, 
because foregone revenue is a 
precondition to finding a subsidy 
under the GATT. In a worldwide 
regime such as the United States, 
the answer is clearly yes (and 
deferral is in the tax expenditure 
budget). What about an exemption 
regime?18 The Europeans have 
argued that the exemption of 
foreign source income in Europe is 
part of the normative baseline. But 
defining the baseline for the 
European regimes is hard, since 
they contain many worldwide 
features (such as CFC regimes). 
Thus, I think that it is possible to 
argue that there is "foregone 
revenue" here as well, even if it is 
not reflected in the tax expendi-
ture budget. 
But what about the footnote 
that specifically excludes regimes 
designed to avoid double taxation? 
While the intent of this footnote 
was to exclude the European 
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regimes, query whether an 
exemption regime that does not 
take into account whether the 
income was subject to tax at source 
qualifies as a "measure to avoid 
double taxation." Fundamentally, a 
general exemption regime distin-
guishes between domestic and 
foreign source activities in a way 
that frequently subsidizes exports, 
not just investments, and, 
In the short run, the 
OECD is clearly the 
superior forum to 
address the problem of 
harmful tax competition 
because of the progress 
it has already made on 
this issue. 
therefore, can be construed as an 
export subsidy if the income is not 
taxed at source. 19 
III. Should Harmful Tax 
Competition Be Addressed 
Through the WTO? 
I have argued elsewhere that 
the problem of harmful tax compe-
tition cannot be adequately 
addressed by the current interna-
tional tax regime based on 
bilateral treaties.20 A multilateral 
effort clearly is needed, and the 
question is whether the proper 
forum for it is the WTO or an orga-
nization such as the OECD, with a 
more restricted membership and 
fewer adjudicatory powers. 
The OECD is clearly the 
superior forum in the short run 
Special Reports 
because of the progress it has 
already made on the issue. 
However, in the long run, relying 
on the OECD to restrict harmful 
tax competition suffers from three 
significant drawbacks. First, the 
OECD only has 29 members, and 
it is not clear that it can effectively 
enforce its anti-tax competition 
rules on non-member countries.21 
For example, solutions that rely on 
where the parents of MNEs are 
located assume that no significant 
growth in MNEs will take place 
outside the OECD, and solutions 
that rely on the OECD as the 
market assume no significant 
markets outside the OECD. Either 
assumption may become wrong, 
and when that happens solutions 
that rely on OECD enforcement 
will lose their effectiveness unless 
those emerging markets were to 
join the OECD. While several 
developing countries have joined 
the OECD recently (e.g., South 
Korea and Mexico), it is hard to 
imagine China or India doing so in 
the near future. 
Second, relying on the OECD to 
implement solutions to the 
harmful tax competition problem, 
even if those solutions are tailored 
to benefit developing countries, 
may not be acceptable to those 
countries. Even though the OECD 
has made a huge effort to include 
non-OECD members in the tax 
18That is why the new U.S. exclusion 
for "qualifYing foreign trade income" (new 
code section 114) seems unlikely to pass 
WTO muster, since it operates in the 
context of a worldwide tax regime. 
19Note, however, that the FSC report 
does seem to approve of "territorial tax 
systems." But this is dicta; if the case ever 
came before the WTO, the U.S. seems to 
have a stronger argument for complaining 
about the European exemption systems 
than most tax experts assume. 
20See Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra. 
21The EU effort is even more limited in 
scope, and has run into significant prob-
lems because of this, as the recent develop-
ments on taxation of savings make clear 
(the U.K. and Luxembourg will cooperate 
only if Switzerland and the U.S. do). 
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competition project, it is still iden-
tified as the rich countries' club. 
Thus, it is hard to believe that 
developing countries will be able to 
shed their suspicions that the 
OECD will not act in their 
interests even if it actually does so. 
Third, the OECD effort is 
limited so far to geographically 
mobile financial services, and 
excludes real investments, 
although these constitute a signifi-
cant part of the problem. In 
addition, even for the areas it does 
cover, the OECD has only the 
power to persuade, not to adjudi-
cate. 
From these perspectives, the 
wro is a more attractive 
candidate for "world tax organiza-
tion." It has a much broader 
membership than the OECD, and 
developing countries are much 
better represented (and have real 
clout, as shown by the recent 
struggle over choosing the Director 
General of the wro, as well as by 
events at Seattle). Moreover, as 
indicated above, the wro rules 
already cover and prohibit most 
forms of harmful tax competition 
identified by the OECD. 
But there are several serious 
objections to including tax matters 
in the jurisdiction of the wro. 
First, it has been argued that the 
wro lacks sufficient tax 
expertise.22 However, that problem 
can be remedied by hiring a suffi-
cient number of tax experts to sit 
on the WfO's panels. In fact, as 
the wro has expanded its juris-
diction to non-tariff matters, its 
staff already includes tax experts 
who also understand trade issues. 
Robert Green has advanced a 
more serious objection, arguing 
that the costs of imposing the 
WfO's legalistic dispute-resolution 
mechanism outweigh any 
benefits. 23 Green argues that the 
need for the wro to resolve trade 
disputes legalistically is based on 
two features that are typically 
lacking in the tax context: retalia-
tion and lack of transparency. 
Retaliation is a feature of repeated 
prisoners' dilemma-type games 
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and insures that players have an 
incentive to cooperate.24 In an 
assurance (stag hunt) game, both 
players cooperate if they can be 
assured of the other player's coop-
eration.25 In the first case, an orga-
nizational setting is needed to 
manage retaliatory strategies 
while, in the second, it is needed to 
provide the information required 
for the assurance to exist. 
However, in the context of tax 
competition, it would seem that 
both retaliation and lack of infor-
mation are serious problems. For 
example, in the case of portfolio 
investment the U.S. began a race 
to the bottom by abolishing its 
withholding tax, and other 
countries responded (i.e., retali-
ated) by abolishing their own 
taxes. In the current situation, no 
country dare re-impose its tax 
without adequate assurance that 
other countries will follow. 
Similarly, for direct investment, 
countries have adopted tax incen-
tives or have adopted deferral and 
exemption rules for their resident 
MNEs in response to the actions of 
other countries and fear of 
changing such policies without 
assurance that others will follow 
suit. Thus, whether these develop-
ments are characterized as prison-
ers' dilemma or assurance games, 
they seem to present precisely the 
kind of problem that only a multi-
lateral organization with 
rule-making power can effectively 
resolve.26 
However, Green also raises 
another objection to giving the 
wro authority over taxes which, 
in practice, is likely to be far more 
potent: the problem of sovereignty. 
Countries are wary of giving up 
their sovereignty over tax matters, 
which lies at the heart of their 
ability to exercise national power. 
This concern is particularly acute 
in the U.S. and almost led to the 
failure of the entire Uruguay 
Round as the U.S. insisted, at the 
last minute, on excluding direct 
taxes from the purview of the 
GATS.27 Green argues that if the 
wro dispute resolution 
mechanism were given authority 
over tax issues, this may lead to 
widespread noncompliance, espe-
22See Robert E. Hudec, ''Reforming 
GATT Adjudication Procedures: The 
Lessons of the DISC Case," 72 Minn. L. 
Rev. 1443 (1988); William M. Considine, 
'The DISC Legislation: An Evaluation," 7 
N.Y.U. J. Int'l. L. & Pol. 217 (1974). 
23See Robert M. Green, "Antilegalistic 
Approaches to Resolving Disputes 
Between Governments: A Comparison of 
the International Tax and Trade Regimes," 
23 Yale lnt'l L. J. 79 (1998). 
24See id.; see also Robert Axelrod, The 
Evolution of Cooperation (1984). 
25The assurance game has a payoff 
structure in which the best outcome is if 
both countries cooperate, while in the pris-
oner's dilemma, the best outcome is if you 
defect and the other side cooperates. See 
"Antilegalistic Approaches," supra. 
26The race to the bottom in internation-
al taxation in the 1980s resembled a pris-
oners' dilemma, in which one country (the 
U.S.) preferred to defect while others coop-
erate in order to draw investment to it. 
But the current situation is more like an 
assurance game, in which the U.S. and 
other OECD members would prefer coop-
eration above all other outcomes. 
27 See "Antilegalistic Approaches," 
supra. 
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cially given the perception that the 
WTO is non-transparent and that 
it lacks democratic legitimacy.2s 
Green may be wrong about this 
estimate, especially since the 
analysis above has shown that the 
WTO already has jurisdiction on 
most forms of harmful tax competi-
tion, so that further extension of its 
powers would be unnecessary. But 
even if Green is right and sover-
eignty poses a real problem, there 
may be a solution to this as well. 
Under the GA'IT regime, all 
decisions had to be reached by 
consensus, i.e., with the agreement 
of the party whose regime is at 
stake. Under the WTO rules, on the 
other hand, all dispute settlement 
rulings are binding unless there is 
a consensus not to implement them, 
i.e., when even the complaining 
party agrees to refrain from action. 
Perhaps the former rule is more 
appropriate for tax matters than 
the latter, because it gives the loser 
a veto if it feels that its sovereignty 
is truly at stake. Similar rules exist 
for tax matters in both the EU and 
the OECD. But, as the DISC case in 
the GA'IT and the adoption of the 
tax competition report by the 
OECD show, a country will 
typically reserve its veto power only 
to those cases in which the adverse 
result is truly perceived as a severe 
limit on its sovereignty. In other 
cases, the stigma of disapproval is 
sufficient to ensure cooperation. 
IV. Conclusion 
The OECD's effort to combat 
harmful tax competition has so far 
been a remarkable success, 
achieving much more progress in a 
short time frame than most 
observers would have predicted 
when it started in 1998. However, 
the hard part is yet to be tackled: 
will countries actually give up 
their preferential tax regimes 
under the timetable devised by the 
OECD? In addition, the OECD has 
not yet addressed the problem of 
preferential regimes for real 
investments, and it is unclear 
whether it can achieve progress on 
preferential regimes in 
non-member countries. 
From this perspective, I believe 
that it is helpful and not harmful 
to the OECD effort (which I whole-
heartedly support) to point out 
that most of the preferential tax 
regimes identified by the OECD 
may also be export subsidies, and 
therefore subject to attack under 
current WTO rules. The prospect 
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of repeating the FSC struggle over 
and over again on a worldwide 
basis may indeed be a powerful 
impetus for inducing both member 
and non-member countries to 
cooperate with the less coercive 
and less costly OECD effort. But 
should the OECD effort fail, then 
serious consideration should be 
given to pursuing the goal of 
limiting harmful tax competition 
through the WTO, in the ways 
outlined above.29 + 
28See id.; see also Joel P. Trachtman, 
"The Domain ofWTO Dispute Resolution," 
40 Harv. Int'l L. J. 333 (1999) (describing 
factors to be weighed in choosing between 
rules and standards in the WTO context). 
But it should be noted that the WTO 
already has exercised jurisdiction over 
matters such as food safety, intellectual 
property, and similar issues that also 
involve sensitive sovereignty issues. 
290f course, this assumes that some 
forms of tax competition should be limited. 
For the normative argument as to why 
they should, as well as an attempt to 
distinguish, on a principled basis, harmful 
from beneficial tax competition, see 
Avi-Yonah, supra. 
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